Reasoning deficits in ecstasy (MDMA) polydrug users by Fisk, JE et al.
Reasoning deficits in ecstasy (MDMA) polydrug users. 
 
John E. Fisk and Catharine Montgomery 
Liverpool John Moores University 
 
Michelle Wareing and Philip N. Murphy 
Edge Hill College of Higher Education 
 
Running head: reasoning deficits. 
 
Corresponding author: 
Dr John E Fisk 
School of Psychology 
Liverpool John Moores University 
15-21 Webster Street 
Liverpool L3 2ET 
United Kingdom 
 
Telephone: 44 (0) 151 231 4035;  Fax: 44 (0) 151 231 4245 
e-mail:    j.e.fisk@livjm.ac.uk 
 
 2 
ABSTRACT. 
 
Objectives. Previous research has shown that ecstasy users are impaired in 
thinking and reasoning. The present study sought to explore the possibility that 
syllogistic reasoning errors in ecstasy users were due to an inability to construct a 
model of the premises due to working memory limitations. Methods. Twenty-nine 
ecstasy users and 25 non-ecstasy user controls completed syllogistic reasoning 
problems varying in difficulty. Results. On the easier problems both groups performed 
at well above chance although nonusers achieved significantly more correct 
responses. Consistent with existing research, on the more difficult problems, errors by 
nonusers were characterised by incorrect conclusions suggesting that while nonusers 
have the working memory capacity to construct a single model of the premises, this is 
not an exhaustive representation and usually results in an erroneous conclusion. On 
the other hand for all problem types ecstasy users, rather than produce incorrect 
responses, were more likely to fail to generate a conclusion. Conclusions. The present 
results are consistent with the possibility that ecstasy users with their reduced working 
memory capacity may experience difficulty in constructing even a single model of the 
premises. While this might be attributable to the effects of MDMA neurotoxicty, 
many of the ecstasy users in the present study were polydrug users. Thus the 
possibility that other drugs including cannabis and cocaine might contribute to the 
present results cannot be excluded. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
Ecstasy has been a popular recreational drug since the 1980’s. Its key 
psychoactive ingredient, MDMA (3,4-Methlylenedioxymethamphetamine) disrupts 
brain functioning by blocking the reuptake of serontonin and to a lesser extent by 
promoting the release of dopamine (Morgan, 2000). Ecstasy use has been associated 
with a range of cognitive deficits including working memory impairments (see 
Morgan, 2000, for a review). Since aspects of working memory have been implicated 
in reasoning performance (Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Gilhooly et al, 1999; Gilinsky & Judd, 
1990), it is possible that ecstasy users might be impaired in reasoning. Evidence of 
such impairment has been forthcoming from our own laboratory with ecstasy users 
performing significantly worse on measures of syllogistic reasoning relative to 
nonusers (Montgomery, et al, in press). The purpose of the present paper is to further 
explore the basis of reasoning deficits in ecstasy users.  
In relation to working memory and executive functioning, evidence has 
emerged suggesting that ecstasy users score lower than non-user controls on measures 
of these constructs. From our own laboratory, Fisk et al (2004) found that ecstasy 
users scored significantly lower than nonusers on a measure of verbal working 
memory performance. Similar findings were obtained by Wareing et al (2004a) and 
ecstasy-related deficits in visuo-spatial working memory were observed in another 
study (Wareing et al, 2004b). While these studies are consistent with ecstasy-related 
impairment, other researchers have failed to find group-related differences. For 
example, Fox et al (2002) found no evidence of deficits on the strategy component of 
a visuo-spatial working memory task. Similarly, Simon and Mattick (2002) found that 
ecstasy users were unimpaired on the working memory measure of the Weschler 
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Memory Scale III (WMS III). More recently, in a follow-up study Gouzoulis-
Mayfrank et al (in press) found that continued use of ecstasy was not associated with 
any further deterioration in measures of executive functioning including backward 
digit span and the 2 back test. However, users who had ceased using ecstasy did not 
show any improvement in these measures. One possible explanation for the discrepant 
results may be that ecstasy-related deficits only become apparent on tasks that load 
heavily on working memory and executive resources.  
In relation to reasoning, prior to Montgomery et al’s study, this aspect of 
cognition had not been systematically assessed in relation to possible ecstasy-related 
effects. Some studies examined logical thinking and decision-making. For example, 
Gouzoulis-Mayfrank et al (2000) found that ecstasy-cannabis users performed 
significantly worse than both cannabis only, and non-users in tests of logical thinking 
(LPS-4 test) and problem solving (mosaic test).  McCann et al (1999) found that 
ecstasy users were impaired relative to nonusers in tests of logical reasoning. From 
our own laboratory, Montgomery et al (in press) found that ecstasy users were 
impaired in syllogistic reasoning, producing fewer correct responses than nonusers. 
The syllogisms used varied in terms of their difficulty. Users were impaired on the 
least difficult problems. However, on the more difficult problems both users and 
nonusers performed at little above chance level. 
Among the different measures of reasoning competence, syllogistic reasoning 
is perhaps one of the best known (Evans et al, 1999; Johnson-Laird, 1983). Like other 
forms of reasoning, syllogistic deduction requires a participant to draw valid 
inferences from a set of premises. For Example,  
  Given that:   Some A are B,  
and 
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           No B are C 
 It follows that:  Some A are not C.  
 
Johnson-Laird (1983) maintains that reasoning involves constructing mental models 
of the premises and testing conclusions against these models. Constructing a single 
model may be sufficient to solve some problems, while others may require up to three 
models. The construction and temporary retention of these models uses up cognitive 
resources, in particular working memory. One-model problems place the smallest 
demands on the working memory system, more complex problems as well as those 
that have no valid conclusions, require the construction of either two or three models 
to derive a solution and place the largest demands on the working memory system. 
Beyond working memory, syllogistic reasoning is also believed to utilise other 
resources, for example relations between linguistic concepts such as ‘all’, ‘some’ and 
the logical operator ‘not’, as well as spatial representations of class inclusion 
relationships (see, for example, Ford, 1995). 
Our earlier findings (Montgomery et al, in press) leave a number of questions 
unanswered. While ecstasy users did perform significantly worse than nonusers on the 
one-model syllogisms, contrary to expectations, there was no group difference on the 
more difficult three-model syllogisms and syllogisms for which there was no valid 
conclusion (NVC). As these load more heavily on working memory resources it had 
been expected that they would be associated with a more pronounced ecstasy-related 
deficit. Our results might be explained in terms of Evans and co-workers’ account of 
syllogistic reasoning (Evans et al, 1999; Handley et al, 2000; Newstead et al, 1999; 
Newstead et al, 2002). According to Evans, individuals generally construct only a 
single mental model of the premises and fail to search for alternatives. For both one-
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model and more complex syllogisms, the premises need to be retained so that 
alternative possible conclusions can be accepted or rejected in the context of the initial 
mental model and the contents of working memory updated as necessary. The ecstasy 
related deficit that was evident on the one-model problems appears to be consistent 
with some degree of impairment in this process. When attempting the NVC/three 
model problems, according to Evans et al (1999), individuals again construct only a 
single model, which does not provide an exhaustive representation of the implications 
of the premises. Therefore in the case of our previous study (Montgomery et al, in 
press) with both users and nonusers, constructing just a single model, most inferences 
derived from it would be likely to be erroneous and group differences would therefore 
not be expected on these NVC/three model problems.  
Accepting Evans et al’s account of reasoning performance, the ecstasy-related 
deficit on the less difficult one-model syllogisms is consistent with the possibility that 
ecstasy users may lack the working memory resources to construct even a single 
model from the premises. As noted above working memory deficits have been 
established in ecstasy users. Wareing et al (2004a) found that ecstasy users were 
impaired on the computation span measure, which is an established measure of verbal 
working memory capacity (Fisk & Sharp, 2004). Deficits among ecstasy users have 
also been observed in visuo-spatial working memory (Wareing et al 2004b). Thus it is 
clearly possible that ecstasy users may find it more difficult to construct the single 
mental model needed to derive a solution. If this proves to be the case, then rather 
than produce incorrect conclusions to syllogisms, ecstasy users might be expected to 
be more likely to generate no conclusion at all. Producing an incorrect conclusion 
requires the ability to construct at least some model of the premises albeit an invalid 
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one. According to Evans et al this is what typically occurs when individuals are 
confronted with three model syllogisms.  
 If ecstasy users are less able to produce the single model required to derive a 
solution, then for one-model problems, it is predicted that users will obtain fewer 
correct conclusions and that errors will be characterised by a failure to generate a 
response rather than an incorrect response. For three model problems it is predicted 
that while nonusers will be capable of producing a response, since it is likely to be 
based on only a single model it is likely to be incorrect. On the other hand it is 
predicted that a significant number of ecstasy users will be unable to produce any 
response on the three model problems due to their inability to form the necessary 
model of the premises. Thus a different pattern of errors is predicted for the user and 
nonuser groups. In our previous study we failed to consider this aspect. The present 
study is designed to address this omission as well as to replicate our previous 
findings. 
A problem with research in this area is that the ecstasy-related deficits 
observed may be at least in part, attributable to cannabis or the concomitant use of 
other drugs. For example, Croft et al (2001) found no significant differences on a 
range of cognitive measures between individuals who used both ecstasy and cannabis 
and cannabis-only users. However, the combined drug-using group (merging the 
cannabis only and ecstasy/cannabis group) performed worse than controls on working 
memory (forward and backward digit span), information processing, and learning and 
recognition memory. Simon and Mattick (2002) failed to find any evidence of 
ecstasy-related deficits on the WMS III, on a short form measure of intelligence, and 
on vocabulary subtest of the WAIS III. However, there was an inverse relationship 
between immediate visual recall and frequency of cannabis use. More recently Dafters 
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et al (2004) found that combined ecstasy-cannabis users, although worse than drug 
free controls on various measures of episodic memory (free recall and story recall), 
did not differ significantly from cannabis only users on any of the measures that were 
administered. Both Croft et al and Dafters et al concluded that cannabis, not ecstasy, 
was responsible for the deficits. In relation to the present study, it is important 
therefore to consider the extent to which cannabis and other drugs might contribute to 
any apparent ecstasy-group related deficit in reasoning performance. 
 
METHOD. 
Participants. 
Twenty-nine ecstasy users (mean age 22.55, S.D. 3.79, range 20-37) and 25 
non-ecstasy user controls (mean age 20.84, S.D. 1.37, range 20-25) were recruited. 
Participants were initially recruited through direct approach to undergraduate students 
at Liverpool John Moores University. Students were asked if they were willing to be 
involved in a study examining the effects of ecstasy and cannabis on aspects of 
cognitive functioning. Subsequently participants were recruited through the “snowball 
technique” (Solowij et al, 1992). Those participating in the study were asked to 
abstain from taking illicit drugs for at least seven days prior to testing. None of the 
participants took part in our previous study on syllogistic reasoning. Participants were 
paid 15 UK pounds in store vouchers for their participation. 
 
Materials. 
A background questionnaire used by Wareing et al (2004a) assessed the use of ecstasy 
and other drugs, as well as age, years of education, other lifestyle variables and a 
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measure of psychological health. Fluid intelligence was measured through Raven’s 
progressive matrices (Raven et al, 1998).   
Syllogistic reasoning: Participants attempted to generate solutions for four 
one-model syllogisms, four three-model syllogisms, and four syllogisms for which 
there was no valid conclusion (NVC). The syllogisms used in the study were 
presented in random order. Participants were introduced to the concept of a syllogism, 
and examples (concrete and abstract) were provided. Examples and explanations were 
also provided for some correct and incorrect inferences, and Venn diagrams were used 
for purposes of illustration.  Participants were told to generate as many conclusions as 
possible for each pair of premises. They were told that no pair generated more than 
two valid conclusions, some only generated one, and some had no valid conclusions. 
In addition, they were provided with a list of the eight possible solutions that can be 
generated over all the pairs of premises. The syllogisms were presented in a booklet, 
in abstract form as in the examples set out above. In each case, the two premises were 
printed, followed by the instruction to ‘Please write down all valid conclusions’. Two 
boxes were provided underneath for the participant to record their responses.  A 
response was deemed correct if it followed necessarily from the premises or in the 
case of the NVC syllogisms, if the participant indicated that no valid conclusions were 
possible. Errors were classified as either an incorrect conclusion when they did not 
follow logically from the premises or ‘no response’ when the individual failed to 
produce any conclusion. The syllogisms were the same as those used by Fisk and 
Sharp (2002) and Montgomery et al (in press). According to Johnson-Laird (1983), 
NVC syllogisms require either two or three mental models in order to derive the 
correct solution. In the present study, two of the NVC syllogisms were two-model and 
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two were three-model. Therefore, in terms of the number of models required, three-
model syllogisms and NVC syllogisms were the hardest, and one-model the easiest.  
 
Procedure. 
Participants were informed as to the nature of the study and provided written 
consent. The tests were administered under controlled laboratory conditions. They 
were administered in the following order: Health/ education questionnaire, 
background drug use questionnaire, syllogistic reasoning test, and Ravens progressive 
matrices. A range of other measures was also administered the results of which are 
outside the scope of the present study and which have been reported elsewhere, for 
example, random letter generation (Wareing et al, 2002; Fisk et al, 2004), a mood 
adjective checklist, sleep quality questionnaire, and the Epworth Sleepiness Scale 
(Wareing 2005). Rest breaks were incorporated as necessary, and testing was 
terminated if participants showed signs of discomfort. After all the measures had been 
administered, participants were debriefed, paid 15 UK pounds in store vouchers, and 
provided with drug education leaflets. The study was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of Liverpool John Moores University, and was administered in accordance 
with the ethical guidelines of the British Psychological Society.   
 
Design and Analysis 
 The data were analysed for skewness, kurtosis, and homogeneity of variance. 
Following the procedure outlined by Tabachnick and Fidell, with regard to skewness, 
a value for z was computed by dividing the skewness statistic by its standard error. In 
relation to kurtosis a value for z was computed by taking the square root of the ratio of 
the kurtosis statistic to its standard error.  According to Tabachnick and Fidell, for 
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samples of this size, the computed z values should be evaluated conservatively in both 
cases, so that ratios yielding z values exceeding 3.00, p<.001, are indicative of a 
departure from normality (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Homogeneity of variance was 
initially evaluated using Levene’s test. Since this measure is considered oversensitive, 
in situations where homogeneity was not obtained a value for Fmax (the ratio of the 
largest cell variance to the smallest) was calculated. According to Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2001, p80) a value for Fmax as large as 10 is acceptable given the ratio of the 
sample sizes for the two groups in the present study. 
 Where normality and homogeneity of variance was obtained, mixed ANOVA 
was used with user group (ecstasy users versus nonusers) between participants and 
error type (incorrect versus non response) and level of difficulty (one model, NVC 
and three model) within participants. Dependent variables included the number of 
correct conclusions generated and the number of errors for the one-model, NVC, and 
three-model problem types. Errors were further classified according to whether they 
were characterised by an incorrect conclusion or a failure to produce a conclusion. 
Where normality was not achieved, ecstasy user group differences were evaluated by 
the Mann Whitney U test. 
The relationship between various measures of amphetamine, cannabis, 
cocaine, and ecstasy use and measures of syllogistic reasoning errors will be 
investigated through bivariate correlation.  
 
RESULTS. 
Background variables. Examination of Table 1 reveals that ecstasy users were 
significantly older than nonusers, consumed alcohol significantly more frequently, 
and ingested significantly more units per week. However the two groups did not differ 
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in terms of years of education, the self-report health measure, and Raven’s measure of 
fluid intelligence. Ecstasy users had consumed on average a total of 362 tablets. The 
average length of use was 211 weeks and the average weekly dose just under two 
tablets.  
<insert Table 1 about here> 
With regard to the use of other drugs most ecstasy users were also regular 
users of cannabis and a substantial minority of ecstasy users also used cocaine and 
amphetamine (Table 2). However in relation to amphetamine none of the participants 
were currently using the drug. Among non-ecstasy users, the use of other drugs was 
rare and largely limited to cannabis. Eight non-ecstasy users who had used cannabis 
occasionally in the past were unable to provide an estimate of their use. Two of the 
non-ecstasy users had also previously used amphetamine and cocaine on an 
occasional basis but again were unable to quantify the amount. 
<insert Table 2 about here> 
Syllogistic reasoning.  
In relation to the number of correct responses, the NVC and three model 
responses exhibited substantial positive skewness yielding statistics of 1.428 and 
1.580 respectively, both with standard error of 0.325. The resulting ratios both yield z 
values exceeding 3.00, p<.001, which are indicative of a departure from normality for 
samples of this size. Regarding the one model correct responses, skewness was non 
significant, p>.05. For all three variables (one model, NVC and three model correct 
responses), kurtosis was nonsignificant, p>.01 in one case and p>.05 in the remaining 
two cases. Similarly homogeneity of variance was obtained, p>.05 in all three cases 
via Levene’s test. 
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With regard to the six syllogistic reasoning error measures, tests for normality 
revealed that kurtosis was not significant for any of these, p > .01 in one case and 
p>.05 in the remaining five cases. Similarly only one of the six error response 
variables exhibited substantial positive skewness yielding a statistic of 1.43 with 
standard error of 0.325, z = 4.37, p<.001, which is indicative of a departure from 
normality. For the remaining five measures p>.001 in one case and p>.05 for the other 
four. Using Levene’s test, homogeneity of variance was obtained for five of the six 
measures, p> .05. In the case of NVC non responses, Levene’s test was significant 
F(1,51) = 4.34, p = .042. However, even in this case a value for Fmax = 3.069 was 
obtained, which is acceptable given the ratio of the sample sizes for the two groups. 
The mean number of correct syllogistic reasoning responses for the ecstasy 
user and nonuser groups are set out in Table 3. As expected, performance on the three 
model and NVC syllogisms was poor. Of the ecstasy user group, 75% failed to get 
any answers correct on the three model syllogisms. For the NVC syllogisms 62% 
failed to get any correct. For non-ecstasy users, 44% failed to achieve any correct 
answers for the three model problems, while the equivalent figure for the NVC 
problems was 60%. For the one-model syllogisms, Table 3 reveals that on average 
ecstasy users and non-ecstasy users achieved 3.14 and 4.64 correct answers 
respectively. In relation to the one-model correct responses, where normality and 
homogeneity of variance were obtained, ANOVA revealed that users performed 
significantly worse than nonusers, F(1,52) = 7.83, p<.01, partial 2= .131. Normality 
was not obtained in relation to NVC and three model correct responses. In these cases, 
Mann Whitney U test showed that nonusers also achieved more correct responses than 
users on the three model syllogisms, U = 245.50, p<.05. However the group 
difference on the NVC syllogisms was non-significant, U = 340.50, p>.05. 
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<insert Table 3 about here> 
The different types of errors committed by ecstasy users and nonusers for the 
one model, NVC and three model problems are summarised in Table 4. Consistent 
with prediction, nonusers tended to generate more incorrect responses while ecstasy 
users generally failed to produce any response. In view of the fact that seventeen of 
the 18 tests for violations of normality and homogeneity were non-significant, 
syllogistic reasoning errors were analysed using repeated measures ANOVA. Type of 
error (incorrect versus no response) and problem type (one model, NVC, three model) 
were within participants and ecstasy user group was between participants. Consistent 
with expectation, reasoning errors among non-ecstasy users were characterised by 
incorrect responses, while among ecstasy users, reasoning errors were characterised 
by a failure to respond. This produced a significant interaction between error type and 
ecstasy user group, F(1,51) = 12.27, p<.001, partial 2= .194. This was qualified by a 
significant three way problem type by error type by ecstasy user group interaction, 
F(1.68,85.63) = 4.10, p < .05, partial 2= .074 (since Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
was significant, degrees of freedom have been adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser 
epsilon value). Compared to nonusers, ecstasy users were less likely to produce a 
response for all problem types. In relation to incorrect responses, nonusers produced 
more for the three model and NVC problems but there was little difference between 
the groups for the one model problems. 
<insert Table 4 about here> 
In view of the significant group differences in average age and in the two 
measures of alcohol consumption (Table 1), these three variables were entered as 
covariates and the analysis of syllogistic reasoning errors was repeated. Consistent 
with the main analysis, the group by error type interaction remained statistically 
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significant, F(1,45) = 5.04, p<.05, with nonusers tending to produce incorrect 
responses while ecstasy users tended to fail to produce a response. Homogeneity of 
regression was obtained for all three covariates, F<1 (age and frequency of alcohol 
use) and F(1,46) = 3.48, p>.05 (units of alcohol) for the respective group by covariate 
interactions. 
Potential effects of other drugs. As noted above many of the ecstasy users in 
the present study were polydrug users having consumed cannabis, amphetamine and 
cocaine in addition to ecstasy. There were too few users of these other drugs among 
the non-ecstasy user group to conduct ANCOVA as tests for homogeneity of 
regression would be unreliable. This leaves open the possibility that the effects 
observed in the present study might be due to the cocktail of illicit drugs consumed by 
the ecstasy user group. To address this possibility various measures of illicit drug use 
were correlated with the total number of incorrect syllogistic reasoning responses and 
with the number of non-responses. In addition measures of alcohol use were also 
included. The results are set out in Table 5. All of the measures of ecstasy use were 
significantly correlated with incorrect responses and non-responses on the syllogistic 
reasoning task. As the level of ecstasy use increased, the number of non-responses 
also increased while the number of incorrect responses decreased. With regard to 
cannabis, total lifetime use, and average weekly dose were significantly correlated 
with the syllogistic reasoning error outcomes with the nature of the correlations being 
the same as was the case for the ecstasy measures. Frequency of cannabis use was 
negatively correlated with the number of incorrect syllogistic responses as was the 
equivalent ecstasy measure. Interestingly, average weekly dose of cocaine and the 
cocaine user/nonuser variable were significantly correlated with the syllogistic 
reasoning error measures. Despite the relatively large number of significant 
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correlations in Table 5, it is worthy of note that after full Bonferroni correction (with 
α = .0015625) only three of the correlations remained statistically significant. All 
three involved the number of non-responses on the syllogistic reasoning task and the 
corresponding drug use variables were the total lifetime use of ecstasy, average 
weekly dose of ecstasy, and the user/nonuser ecstasy group variable. The correlations 
between the frequency of ecstasy use and syllogistic non-responses and the average 
weekly dose of cocaine and non-responses were just short of significance, with p = 
.0017375, and p = .0015695 respectively. 
<insert Table 5 about here> 
 
DISCUSSION. 
As expected, ecstasy users achieved fewer correct responses on the one-model 
problems relative to nonusers. This replicates our previous findings (Montgomery et 
al , in press). In the present study nonusers managed to do significantly better on the 
three model problems also. This contrasts with our previous study in which no deficits 
were obtained on the three model problems. In the present study the nonuser group 
obtained a mean of 1.08 correct answers on these problems compared to ecstasy users 
who only managed to obtain a mean of 0.45. In our previous study the equivalent 
figures were 0.81 and 0.82 for nonusers and users respectively.  Thus relative to the 
outcomes obtained in our previous study, the significance difference on the three 
model problems obtained here is due to a slightly higher level of performance among 
the nonusers and a rather larger diminution in the ecstasy users’ performance.  
If ecstasy users were less able to produce the single model necessary to 
generate a conclusion, then relative to nonusers, they would be more likely to produce 
no response in both the one model and the NVC/three model contexts. On the other 
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hand nonusers would be expected to achieve more correct solutions on the one-model 
problems where a single model is sufficient to achieve a valid conclusion. However, 
on the three model and NVC problems where the initial model of the premises is 
insufficient to produce a valid response they would make more incorrect responses 
compared to users. These expectations were fulfilled and overall, ecstasy users did 
exhibit more non-responding relative to nonusers, while nonusers made more 
incorrect responses on the more difficult NVC and three model problems relative to 
users. 
These findings suggest that ecstasy users with their reduced working memory 
capacity (Fisk et al, 2004; Wareing et al 2004a; 2004b) are less able to retain the 
premises in working memory and as a consequence experience difficulty in forming 
the initial model necessary to draw a conclusion. The present results also add to the 
growing body of research evidence favouring Evans et al’s (1999) account of 
syllogistic reasoning processes. It appears that only those with above average working 
memory capacity are able to go beyond the initial model of the premises when 
confronted with more complex reasoning problems (Handley et al, 2000; Newstead et 
al, 2002) and the results of the present study suggests that ecstasy users are far less 
likely to be found among this group. It remains to be seen which aspects of working 
memory and executive functioning are involved in syllogistic reasoning performance. 
Miyake et al (2000) and Fisk and Sharp (2004) have proposed that the executive 
processes underpinning the operation of working memory are separable. The 
processes identified include updating, switching, inhibition, and access to semantic 
memory. It would be desirable to repeat the present study with measures of these four 
processes to establish which aspects of executive functioning might be implicated in 
ecstasy-related syllogistic reasoning deficits. Recent findings from our laboratory 
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suggest that the updating and semantic access executive processes are especially 
susceptible to ecstasy-related impairment (Montgomery et al 2005). 
At a psychopharmacological level, it is possible that the impairments in 
reasoning performance observed in ecstasy users could be associated with ecstasy 
related neurotoxicity especially in the prefrontal cortex which is known to play an 
important role in supporting reasoning and working memory processes (see for 
example, Goel et al, 2000). For example, using PET neuroimaging, McCann et al 
(1998), showed that compared to non-users, ecstasy users had significantly lower 
densities of 5HT transporter sites in diverse brain regions including the frontal cortex, 
pariental cortex, cingulate cortex, and in subcortical structures including the caudate, 
putamen, and cerebellum (these sub-cortical structures have also been implicated in 
syllogistic reasoning performance; Goel et al, 2000).  Further, the decreases observed 
were positively correlated with the extent of ecstasy use.  Neural injury in ecstasy 
users was also assessed by Reneman et al (2002a) using single-voxel (1H) MR 
spectroscopy imaging.  N-Acetylasportate (NAA)/Creatine (CR), NAA Choline 
(CHO), and Myoinositol (MI) CR ratios were measured in the frontal, occipital, and 
parietal cortices. These ratios serve as a marker for neuronal loss or dysfunction. 
Although no significant differences between ecstasy users and nonusers were found in 
the occipital and parietal cortex, ecstasy users did exhibit a reduction of NAA/Cr and 
NAA/Cho ratios in the frontal cortex.  Furthermore, the level of the reduction in the 
frontal cortex was significantly correlated with the extent of ecstasy use. In another 
study using SPECT imaging, post-synaptic 5-HT2a receptor densities were examined 
(Reneman et al, 2002b). Compared to previous ecstasy users and controls, current 
ecstasy users had significantly lower binding ratios in the frontal, parietal, and 
occipital cortices. By way of contrast, previous users showed significantly higher in 
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binding ratios in certain brain areas perhaps due to a compensatory up-regulation of 
post-synaptic 5-HT2a receptors due to low synaptic 5-HT levels. Thus to sum up the 
ecstasy-related reasoning deficits that were observed in the present study might be a 
consequence of MDMA related neurotoxicity affecting those neural areas that are 
believed to support reasoning processes.  
The ecstasy users in the present study were polydrug users while the use of 
drugs among the non-ecstasy group was largely limited to cannabis. Thus caution 
needs to be exercised in attributing the effects observed here solely to ecstasy use. 
Nonetheless, the correlations set out in Table 5 are consistent with various aspects of 
ecstasy use playing an important role in accounting for the results that were obtained. 
We had predicted that use of ecstasy would be associated with an increased propensity 
to produce no response in the reasoning task. Consistent with this prediction, all of the 
various measures of ecstasy use were positively correlated with the number of non-
responses. With regard to the number of incorrect responses, we had predicted that 
these would be more prevalent among nonusers since ecstasy users would be less able 
to produce the single model of the premises which in the three model and NVC 
contexts gives rise to an incorrect response. The correlations were consistent with this 
prediction. As measures of ecstasy use increased, and presumably the capacity to 
generate a single model of the premises decreased, so the likelihood of an incorrect 
response decreased (instead users were more likely to generate no response at all). 
Thus correlations for the ecstasy user variables were negative with increased use 
associated with a reduced level of incorrect responses.  
Measures of cannabis and cocaine use were also correlated with syllogistic 
reasoning errors. While none of these correlations remained statistically significant 
following Bonferroni correction, it is worthy of note that at the unadjusted α = .05 
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level, five of the eight cannabis measures were significantly correlated with the 
syllogistic reasoning errors. However, assuming that the type one errors were 
distributed randomly, the error rate per experiment (Howell, 1997) would indicate that 
no more than one of the cannabis measures should have been significantly correlated 
with the syllogistic reasoning errors. The fact that the actual number of potential type 
one errors involving cannabis exceeds the expected error rate per experiment is 
consistent with the possibility that aspects of cannabis use might have contributed in 
part to the current findings.  
Returning to the different patterns of errors evident in the responses of 
participants, one possible explanation for the prevalence of non-responses among the 
ecstasy user group might have been a general lack of motivation. This however 
appears to be unlikely. Ecstasy users performed as well as nonusers on the Raven’s 
progressive matrices task, which is at least as demanding as syllogistic reasoning. 
They were also unimpaired in random letter generation (see Fisk et al., 2004), which 
is also a cognitively demanding task. Thus the non-responding evident in the 
syllogistic reasoning task appears to reflect something other than a general 
motivational deficit. A further possible explanation for the prevalence of non 
responses is that ecstasy users did not understand the task. However, the average 
number of correct responses achieved by ecstasy users on the easier one model 
syllogisms was 3.14 which is considerably above the single correct response which 
might have been achieved by chance
1
. Thus it appears that ecstasy users did have an 
adequate understanding of the task and that the non-responses must be due to some 
other factor, e.g., difficulty in constructing a model of the premises. 
Given that the present study does demonstrate that ecstasy users are impaired 
in syllogistic reasoning, it is appropriate to consider the likely implications of this 
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deficit. According to Piaget’s notion of formal operational thought (Inhelder & Piaget, 
1958) and Johnson-Laird’s (1983) mental models perspective, the ability to solve 
syllogisms is indicative of a broader capacity for logical thought which supports 
reasoning in everyday contexts. Indeed individual differences in syllogistic reasoning 
performance were found to be significantly correlated with SAT mathematics scores 
among college students (Stanovich & West, 1998) and with cognitive ability scores in 
10 to 13 year old children (Kokis et al, 2002). Furthermore abilities in conditional 
reasoning (Piburn 1990) and syllogistic reasoning (Watters & English, 1995) have 
been linked with the development of scientific reasoning skills in elementary school 
children. Thus the ecstasy-related deficits observed in the present study and in our 
previous one may potentially have implications for ecstasy users in terms of their 
level of educational attainment and their capacity for decision making in every day 
contexts where it is necessary to make inferences about real events. 
A number of limitations were evident in the present study, for example, in 
relation to the correlations, we were reliant on individuals being willing and able to 
provide an accurate account of their previous drug use. Furthermore since it was not 
possible to quantify the amounts of each psychoactive drug present within the tablets 
or joints consumed a further source of error was introduced. Thus it must be 
acknowledged that the interpretation of the correlations that were observed is 
constrained by the accuracy of this data. Additionally, because of limited resources, 
we were unable to use urine, saliva, or hair samples to confirm recent patterns of drug 
use. However, the drug use questionnaire was designed to check the internal 
consistency of the information provided and it is equally worthy of note that most of 
the published studies that have probed cognitive deficits among ecstasy users have not 
resorted to urine, hair, or saliva testing  (e.g., Fox et al, 2002; Morgan, 1999; Parrott 
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& Lasky, 1998; Rodgers, 2000). Nonetheless, this remains a potential limiting factor 
in interpreting our findings. 
Aside from the issue of drug testing, other limitations evident in studies of the 
present kind need to be acknowledged. For example, lifestyle differences and 
premorbid factors cannot be excluded as possible sources of group differences in 
studies of this nature. Ecstasy users may experience altered sleep patterns. They may 
neglect their diet and their physical health and all of these factors have the potential to 
impair cognitive functioning (Cole et al, 2002). Other psychosocial factors need to be 
acknowledged. It may be that ecstasy users arrived at the laboratory with the 
expectation that they would perform worse on the cognitive measures that were to be 
administered and that this expectation became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Croizet et al 
(2004) have shown that stereotype threat can cause groups to under-perform when 
they believe that the measures assessed are associated with group-related deficits. 
When these prior expectations were removed, Croizet et al found that group members 
no longer exhibited impairment. Although Croizet et al’s research did not involve 
drug users, the possibility of stereotype threat cannot be entirely excluded in relation 
to the ecstasy users tested in the present study. Apart from these potentially 
confounding factors it is also important not to over generalise from the present 
findings. For example, given that word of mouth referral was used as the primary 
means of recruiting participants, our ecstasy-user group may not be entirely 
representative of all ecstasy users, especially those who consume the drug in settings 
that are unlike those frequented by those individuals constituting the present sample. 
 Despite these caveats, the present study along with our previous one, does 
suggest that this population of polydrug users are susceptible to reasoning deficits 
which may be associated with difficulties in making everyday decisions in contexts 
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where a number of information sources need to be integrated in a logical manner, for 
example, financial decisions, or career choices. They might also exhibit an impaired 
ability to weigh up the pros and cons of conflicting arguments and might also be 
impaired in academic contexts where the acquisition of complex inter-related 
concepts is necessary.  
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Table 1.  
Performance on background variables and indicators of ecstasy use.  
 
Variables. Ecstasy User Nonuser t 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  
Age       22.55 3.78 20.84 1.37   2.27* 
Education (years)   15.03 2.86 15.20 2.04 -0.24 
Ravens Total Score (fluid 
intelligence) 
47.48 6.34 48.08 5.25 -0.37 
Self report health    3.72 0.80 3.96 0.68   1.16 
Alcohol (units per week) 27.86 20.58 14.90 12.55   2.82** 
Frequency of Alcohol 
Consumption (times per week)
1
 
3.21 1.81 1.91 1.02   3.24** 
      
Ecstasy Use      
    Lifetime Use: Number of  
    Ecstasy Tablets consumed 
  
361.90 391.36    
    Frequency (times per week)  
    
0.33 0.25    
    Length of Use (weeks) 
 
210.57 133.02    
    Weeks since last use 
 
23.22 46.03    
    Average weekly dose (tablets) 
 
1.98 1.92    
 
1. Three ecstasy nonusers failed to indicate their frequency of alcohol use 
** p<.01; * p<.05. 
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Table 2: Use of other illicit drugs 
  
Ecstasy Users 
 
Non-Ecstasy Users 
 
 Mean S.D n Mean S.D. n  
 
Lifetime Use 
      
Amphetamine (g) 170.20 242.02 10 - - - 
Cannabis (joints) 3319.43 3430.05 21 546.40 606.66 5 
 
Cocaine ( g) 68.81 67.96 10 - - - 
 
Frequency (current users only) 
Times per week 
Amphetamine 1.18 1.86 9 
 
- - - 
Cannabis 
 
2.82 3.00 20 0.80 1.25 5 
Cocaine 0.42 0.34 10 - - - 
 
Length of Use (weeks) 
Amphetamine  103.73 87.14 11 78.00 110.31 2 
Cannabis  
 
298.38 145.67 23 189.37  140.68 13 
Cocaine  116.88 65.51 12 151.00 142.84 2 
 
Average Weekly dose 
Amphetamine (g) 2.33 4.52 10 - - - 
Cannabis (joints) 13.00 14.65 20 2.43 3.76 5 
 
Cocaine (g) 1.31 1.98 10 - - - 
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Table 3 
Correct Syllogistic Responses for ecstasy users and non-users 
 Ecstasy Users Non Ecstasy Users 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
One-model 3.14 1.94 4.64         2.00** 
NVC 0.79 1.21 0.71         1.12 
Three-model 0.45 0.95 1.08         1.26* 
 
 
* p<.05; ** p<.01
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Table 4 
Syllogistic Reasoning Errors for ecstasy users and non-users 
Error type Ecstasy Users Non Ecstasy Users 
Models Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Incorrect     
One-model 1.14 1.38 0.92 1.21 
NVC 3.48 2.61 5.17 2.16 
Three-model 3.28 2.43 4.75 1.94 
Total 7.90 4.59 10.83 3.92 
No Response     
One-model 3.72 1.62 2.38 1.53 
NVC 2.93 2.19 1.41 1.25 
Three-model 4.28 2.03 2.21 1.61 
Total 10.93 5.08 6.00 3.49 
 
 
 33 
 
Table 5  
Correlation coefficients between various measures of illicit drug use and syllogistic 
reasoning errors. 
 
Measure/ 
    Illicit Drug 
n Syllogistic 
Reasoning Incorrect 
Responses 
Syllogistic 
Reasoning Non-
Responses 
Total Use    
    Ecstasy 53 -.381**  .540*** 
    Cannabis 41 -.360**  .363** 
    Cocaine 43 -.071  .160 
    Amphetamine 50 -.066  .140 
    
Frequency    
    Ecstasy 52 -.292*  .398** 
    Cannabis 40 -.343*  .242 
    Cocaine 42 -.202  .256 
    Amphetamine 48  .022  .045 
    Alcohol 51 -.320*  .335* 
    
Average 
Weekly Dose 
   
    Ecstasy 53 -.324**  .468*** 
    Cannabis 40 -.263*  .290* 
    Cocaine 42 -.288*  .445** 
    Amphetamine 49  .012  .060 
    Alcohol 53 -.230*   .246* 
    
User/Non User    
    Ecstasy 53  .344** -.492*** 
    Cannabis 53 -.030  .106 
    Cocaine 53  .279* -.389** 
    Amphetamine 53  .053 -.122 
 
Notes: In the case of total use, frequency, and average weekly dose, a value of zero 
was entered for nonusers of the drug in question. For the User/Nonuser variable, users 
were coded zero and nonusers ‘1’. 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; one tailed, unadjusted for multiple comparisons. 
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1
 The mean of 3.14 was significantly greater than 1 the number which might have been achieved by 
chance, t(28) = 5.93, p<.001. 
